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Abstract: This paper illustrates the value of credit derivatives with two examples. A 
commercial bank can use credit derivatives to manage the risk of its loan portfolio. 
However, credit derivatives pose risk management challenges of their own. This paper 
discusses five of these challenges. Credit derivatives can transform credit risk in 
intricate ways that may not be easy to understand. They can create counterparty credit 
risk that itself must be managed. Complex credit derivatives rely on complex models, 
leading to model risk. The settlement of a credit derivative contract following a default 
can have its own complications, creating settlement risk. For the credit derivatives 
market to continue its rapid growth, commercial banks must meet these risk 
management challenges. 
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Résumé: Ce document illustre la valeur des dérivés de crédit avec deux exemples. Une 
banque commerciale peut utiliser des dérivés de crédit pour gérer le risque de son 
portefeuille de prêts. Toutefois, les dérivés de crédit représentent aussi des défis de 
gestion. Cet article examine cinq de ces défis. Les dérivés de crédit peut transformer le 
risque de crédit d’une façon complexe qui n’est pas facile à comprendre. Ils peuvent 
créer des risques de crédit de contrepartie qui doivent être gérés eux-mêmes. Les dérivés 
de crédit complexes reposent sur des modèles complexes, conduisant à un risque de 
modèle. Le règlement d’un contrat den dérivés de crédit suite à un défaut peut avoir ses 
propres complexités, créant le risque de règlement. Pour que le marché de dérivés de 
crédit puisse poursuivre sa croissance rapide, les banques commerciales doivent 
répondre à ces défis de gestion des risques. Pour que le marché de dérivés de crédit 
puisse continuer sa croissance rapide, les banques commerciales doivent faire face à ces 
défis de risques de gestion. 
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1. CREDIT DERIVATIVES ARE USEFUL FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
 
The growth of credit derivatives suggests that market participants find them useful for risk management. 
Figure 1 shows the growth trajectory for credit derivatives from two surveys of derivatives dealers: the 
ISDA Market Survey, which goes back to 2001, and the BIS Semiannual Derivatives Statistics, which goes 
back to 2004. The BIS survey is more accurate, because it adjusts for double counting of inter-dealer trades, 
but both show a similar pattern of rapid growth. Notional amounts of credit derivatives outstanding have 
roughly doubled each year for the past five years. 
 
Figure 1:  Notional amounts of credit derivatives outstanding 
Credit derivatives have been used by a wide variety of market participants. No single data source 
provides definitive information on the activity of different types of market participants. But by combining 
several available data sources, a relatively clear picture emerges. I will refer to two data sources: the BIS 
Semiannual Derivative Statistics, the 2005 report on Credit Risk Transfer by the Joint Forum. 
The most comprehensive data source is the BIS Semiannual Derivative Statistics (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2007). About 55 dealers contribute to this survey which breaks out credit derivative notional 
amounts by the type of counterparty. Table 1 shows this data for December 2006. The largest category is 
reporting dealers, reflecting the inter-dealer nature of the market. In any dealer market, dealers rely on 
inter-dealer trading to adjust their risk profile in response to trading flows from end-users. According to 
dealers, only 5 to 10 percent of their notional amount of derivatives represents hedges of their own credit 
exposures; the balance reflects inter-dealer trading and accommodation of customer demands (Joint Forum, 
2005). 
Table 1:  BIS Semiannual Derivatives Statistics, December 2006 (notional amounts, $billions) 
 
Type of counterparty Dealer bought protection 
from counterparty 
Dealer sold protection to 
counterparty 
Total (adjusted for 
double counting) 
Reporting dealers 16,044 16,165 16,104 
Non-reporting banks and 
security firms 
2,928 2,758 5,686 
Other financial institutions 2,826 2,824 5,650 
Non-financial institutions 561 530 1,091 
Insurance and financial 
guaranty firms 
211 95 306 
Total 22,571 22,372 28,838 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 2007 
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Banks and security firms that are not reporting dealers make up one-fifth of the total. Some of this 
captures non-dealer banks investing on their own account in credit derivatives. Some likely captures banks 
acting as fiduciaries for private banking or high-net-worth investors. The category of "other financial 
institutions" includes hedge funds, pension funds, and special purpose vehicles and makes up another fifth 
of the total. Many structured credit products, including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), make use of 
special purpose vehicles. Hedge funds are active traders but tend to maintain their positions for a short 
amount of time; their share of trading volume would likely be larger than their share of notional amounts 
outstanding. This category is the fastest-growing among the non-reporting dealer categories. Of course, it is 
unclear exactly how much risk transfer that data represents, given that notional amounts cannot be equated 
with risk. 
Commercial banks use credit derivatives to tailor their credit risk exposure. Broadly speaking, they shed 
credit risk via credit derivatives. Banks have used credit derivatives and other means of credit risk transfer, 
such as securitizations, to shed risk in several areas of their credit portfolio, including large corporate loans, 
loans to smaller companies, and counterparty credit risk on over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. Banks use 
single-name CDS to shed the credit risk of issuers to whom they have a large exposure. Banks can transfer 
the credit risk of a portfolio of exposures to investors via securitization transactions, such as collateralized 
loan obligations (CLOs). 
Joint Forum (2005), reporting on interviews held in 2004 with about 60 market participants, found that 
the largest commercial banks had shed a material, but small, amount of credit risk via credit derivatives, 
mainly to their large, investment-grade corporate customers. The Joint Forum also reported that a number 
of commercial banks had scaled back their credit hedging activity. 
However, these conclusions may no longer hold. The amount of credit risk shed by banks may be rising, 
and hedging has spread to categories of credit risk beyond investment-grade corporate loans. A number of 
banks, mainly European, have done large hedging transactions in the past couple of years. Table 2 reports 
several recent hedging transactions by large banks. These transactions are larger and more numerous than 
what had been reported at the time of the Joint Forum survey. In total, these transactions represent the 
equivalent of $88 billion notional amount of credit risk shed by eight large international banks over 
2005-07. In many of these transactions, and in contrast to similar transactions in the late 1990s, the issuing 
bank sold off the first-loss equity tranche of the credit risk. The categories of credit risk shed include not 
only loans to large corporates, but also loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, loans to emerging 
markets, and counterparty exposure on derivatives. Most transactions in the table are synthetic, using credit 
derivatives to transfer risk off the balance sheet. 
Table 2:  Recent hedging transactions by large banks 
 
Date Bank Name of deal Cash or 
synthetic
Collateral Amount 
June 2005 ABN Amro Amstel 2005 Synthetic Corporate loans EUR 10 bil 
December 2005 ABN Amro Smile 2005 Synthetic Dutch SME loans EUR 6.75 bil
November 2006 ABN Amro Amstel 2006 Synthetic Corporate loans EUR 10 bil 
December 2006 ABN Amro Amstel SCO Synthetic Counterparty exposures 
on derivatives 
EUR 7 bil 
February 2007 ABN Amro Smile Securitization 
2007 
Cash Dutch SME loans EUR 4.9 bil
December 2005 Barclays Gracechurch Corporate 
Loans Series 2005-1 
Synthetic UK midsize corporates GBP 5 bil 
January 2007 Barclays Gracechurch Corporate 
Loans 20071 
Synthetic UK SME loans GBP 3.5 bil
February 2007 Credit Suisse Clock Finance Synthetic Swiss SME loans CHF 4.8 bil
July 2005 Deutsche 
Bank 
GATE SME CLO Synthetic SME loans EUR 1.5 bil
June 2006 / 
February 2007 
Deutsche 
Bank 
Craft EM CLO Synthetic Emerging market loans, 
bonds, and counterparty 
exposures 
USD 500m/1 
bil 
To be continued 
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Continued 
 
Date Bank Name of deal Cash or 
synthetic
Collateral Amount 
February 2007 HSBC Trinkaus HEAT 3 Cash SME loans EUR 314 mil
November 2005 HSBC Metrix Funding Cash Corporate loans GBP 2 bil 
November 2006 HSBC Metrix Securities Synthetic Corporate loans GBP 2 bil 
November 2006 Mizuho N/A Synthetic Non-Japanese large 
corporate loans 
JPY 560 bil
October 2006 SocGen Atlas III Synthetic Corporate loans EUR 2.8 bil
November 2006 UBS N/A Bilateral 
swap 
High yield corporate 
loans 
USD 600 mil
Source: Company and rating agency reports and financial press.  
Note: SME = small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
Table 3 shows reported amounts of CDS hedging by the three largest U.S. commercial bank holding 
companies, as reported in their 2006 annual reports, and by one European bank, as reported in the financial 
press. Only U.S. banking organizations appear to disclose CDS hedging in their annual reports. For this 
admittedly small sample, the average percentage of credit risk hedged appears to be larger than what was 
reported by the Joint Forum. 
Table 3:  Hedging done with credit default swaps 
Date Bank Credit exposure 
before hedging 
(billions) 
Amount of hedging 
reported (billions)
Exposure hedged 
(percent) 
Year end 2006 Bank of America USD 618 USD 8 1 
Year end 2006 Citigroup USD 633 USD 93 15 
Year end 2006 JP Morgan Chase USD 631 USD 51 8 
2006 Q1 Societe Generale EUR 60 EUR 15 25 
Source: for U.S. banks, 2006 annual reports; for Societe Generale, "Safety first," Risk, August 2006. 
 
2.  CREDIT DERIVATIVES POSE RISK MANAGEMENT 
CHALLENGES TO COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
The first half of this paper has shown how commercial banks use credit derivatives for managing credit risk. 
However, credit derivatives pose risk management challenges of their own. In the second half of the paper, 
I discuss four of these challenges. 
 
2.1  Credit risk 
One fundamental reality of credit derivatives is that they do not eliminate credit risk. They merely shift it 
around. As a result, when the credit cycle turns and default rates rise, someone, somewhere, will lose 
money. Consider Figure 2, which shows global speculative grade default rates since 1980. Clearly, no one 
should be surprised if when the credit cycle turns, the speculative grade default rate hits 10 percent, which is 
what it hit in 1990-91 and in 2001. 
Although credit derivatives cannot eliminate losses from credit risk, they can transform credit risk in 
intricate ways that may not be easy to understand. This is not an issue with single name credit default swaps, 
where the exposure is nearly identical to that of a corporate bond, or with credit default swap indexes, 
where the exposure is nearly identical to that of a portfolio of corporate bonds. But where complex credit 
derivatives such as CDO tranches are concerned, it is a legitimate risk management issue. 
Do market participants understand their exposures to credit risk that they have taken on with complex 
credit derivatives? Given the breadth of market participants who are active in the credit derivative market, 
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there is no definitive way to answer this question. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Speculative grade default rate 
Source: Moody's Investors Service (2007), Exhibit 21. 
However, we can point to evidence from the last credit cycle that some market participants did not fully 
understand the exposures they had from their participation in the credit derivatives market. In 2001, 
American Express "lost hundreds of millions of dollars on investments in collateralized debt obligations." 
The CEO of American Express was quoted as saying it "did not comprehend the risk" of its CDO holdings. 
The U.K. bank Abbey National was reported to have suffered "disastrous losses in its high-yield portfolio, 
including CDOs," and as a result, liquidated its wholesale credit portfolio, including selling off $8 billion of 
CDO tranches in 2003 (Lucas, Goodman and Fabozzi, 2006, p. 383). In both cases, the banks were reported 
to have retained first-loss tranches of CDOs they had underwritten. And first-loss tranches naturally contain 
a great deal of credit risk. 
This brief review of the experience in the last credit cycle of 2001-02 reinforces the point that credit 
derivatives do not eliminate losses from credit risk. These lessons that I have reviewed here are certainly no 
secret to participants in the credit markets, many of whom had first-hand experience of living through that 
credit cycle. 
Given the rapid growth of the credit derivatives market, it may be fortunate that one of the most widely 
used complex credit derivative structures, the CDO tranche, is a mature product has already been through a 
stressful credit cycle. This should contribute to financial stability during the next credit cycle, whenever 
that may come to pass. 
Of course, new flavors of CDOs will always present new challenges. One relatively new product is a 
CDO using asset-backed securities for collateral instead of corporate debt. In 2006, 60 percent of CDO 
issuance used asset-backed securities as collateral (SIFMA, 2007b). These CDOs transfer the credit risk of 
asset-backed securities, primarily RMBS. Given the slowing growth of house prices in recent months, 
credit risk in the RMBS sector is likely to be increasing. 
 
2.2   Counterparty risk 
Counterparty risk is the risk that the counterparty to a credit derivative contract will default and not pay 
what is owned under the contract. For credit derivatives, as with other OTC derivatives, counterparty risk is 
an important risk that needs to be managed. Given the growing role of hedge funds in the credit derivatives 
market, counterparty risk is becoming even more prominent, since hedge funds generally are among a 
dealer's riskier counterparties. 
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In many cases, dealers use collateral to reduce counterparty risk. According to the 2006 ISDA Margin 
Survey, 63 percent of all counterparty risk exposure on credit derivatives is currently collateralized by large 
dealers. For hedge fund counterparties, a larger share is likely to be covered by collateral, since dealers 
nearly universally require hedge fund counterparties to post collateral to cover current credit exposures. 
However, despite the widespread use of collateral and margin, there are some important risk 
management challenges associated with counterparty risk on credit derivatives. One challenge is simply 
measuring the exposures on complex credit derivatives. One of the key measures of counterparty risk is 
potential future exposure. Potential future exposure takes into account the possible future moves in credit 
spreads or future defaults that could create a larger credit exposure if the market moves in the dealer's favor. 
This potentially larger credit exposure is something that is already present in the current derivative contract 
and therefore should be measured like any other credit exposure. 
Market participants are aware of the need to measure potential future exposure on complex credit 
derivatives, as well as the difficulties. As one article by a practitioner puts it, "unfortunately, models that 
can estimate [counterparty risk exposure] exactly are hard to build and calibrate" (Pugachevsky, 2006,). 
That article describes a technique to approximately measure counterparty risk exposure on synthetic CDO 
tranches, defining counterparty risk exposure as the amount that would be expected to be lost if the 
counterparty defaults in the future. In a stylized example of CDO tranches with a notional amount of 
$5 million, the article estimates the counterparty risk exposure to be around $50,000, or 1 percent of 
notional. Certainly that seems like a material amount of counterparty risk. 
According to one estimate, there were $450 billion of synthetic CDO tranches and $1.7 trillion of credit 
index tranches traded in 2006. One percent of this roughly $2.2 trillion in notional amount would total $22 
billion in counterparty risk exposure, the amount that dealers would collectively expect to lose if all their 
CDO counterparties simultaneously defaulted. If two-thirds of that is collateralized, dealers in aggregate 
would have roughly $7 billion in uncollateralized counterparty risk exposure currently in their portfolios, 
before accounting for hedging. These figures are certainly only a very rough approximation of the order of 
magnitude of the counterparty risk created by complex credit derivatives. In particular, the actual loss from 
counterparty default could well be larger than the expected loss. And of course, any counterparty credit 
exposure amount should be compared with a dealer's capital that is available to absorb potential losses. All 
told, it appears that counterparty risk should be a material concern of participants in the credit derivatives 
market. 
 
2.3  Model risk 
Complex credit derivatives require complex models for valuation and hedging. While a few complex credit 
derivatives, such as credit index tranches, are traded in liquid markets with some price transparency, most 
are not. Products without a liquid market are referred to as "mark-to-model." The risk of loss due to a 
flawed model is known as model risk.  
Model risk materialized in the market for tranched credit derivatives in May 2005. Following the 
downgrade of General Motors to below-investment-grade status, the market prices of some credit index 
tranches moved in ways that would be considered as either extremely implausible or impossible, according 
to the way certain models were being used for valuation and risk management at that time. For example, in 
the first week of May 2005, the credit spread on the CDX.NA.IG index widened, signaling higher credit 
risk, but the spread on the 37 percent mezzanine tranche tightened, signaling lower credit risk. Market 
commentary attributed this to an imbalance of market liquidity in the mezzanine tranche market. There 
were also cases where the models themselves were not the problem, but models were being used in a way 
that gave false confidence about the effectiveness of hedging strategies. 
In fairness to those who build models for a living, it has to be said that the flaws that were revealed by the 
May 2005 episode were not a surprise to many model builders. Even before May 2005, modelers were 
documenting the flaws of the standard model used for trenched credit products, the Gaussian copula model. 
As one paper published in 2004 noted, "Despite the popularity of the Gaussian copula model, there are clear 
and valid questions over its theoretical foundations" (Gregory and Laurent, 2004). 
Of course, any model is only an approximation of reality, and model improvement must be a continuous 
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process for products as new as tranched credit derivatives. In the two years since the May 2005 episode, 
there has been an explosion of research into alternatives to the Gaussian copula model. While eventually 
this research is likely to lead to better models and a reduced level of model risk for complex credit 
derivatives, there could be a long wait until that occurs. For the foreseeable future, those who trade complex 
credit derivatives will need to pay careful attention to measuring and managing their exposure to model 
risk. 
 
2.4  Settlement risk 
When an issuer defaults, credit derivatives that reference the issuer's debt must be settled. Traditionally, 
settlement in the CDS market was based on physical delivery by the protection buyer of the referenced 
issuer's debt securities in exchange for par. Physical settlement is the natural settlement mechanism when a 
CDS is used to hedge the credit risk of owning a bond. Cash settlement is less desirable in that situation, 
because the value of owning the bond of the defaulted issuer may diverge from the cash settlement price on 
a CDS, reducing the effectiveness of the hedge. 
As the credit derivative market has grown, it is now common for the notional amount of CDS outstanding 
referencing a particular issuer to be larger than the face value of the issuer's bonds outstanding. In October 
2005, Delphi Corporation defaulted with $2 billion of deliverable bonds and approximately $28 billion of 
credit derivatives outstanding. Because settlement must occur within a fixed time period after a default, a 
single bond can only be used (and re-used) for settlement of CDS so many times. The potential exists for an 
artificial scarcity of the bonds of defaulted issuers that are needed for CDS settlement, driving up the price 
of the bonds. In the worst case, if the protection buyer cannot obtain the bonds it needs to settle its contracts 
by the deadline, the contract expires worthless. This has the potential to affect the price of CDS in advance 
of a default, making CDS less useful as hedges and distorting the price signals that the CDS provides to the 
market. 
Since the growth of the credit derivatives market shows no signs of slowing down, settlement risk is 
likely to continue to increase as long as physical settlement is the standard in CDS contracts. Market 
participants are certainly aware of the issue and are working on a solution. In the wake of the Delphi default, 
dealers rushed to organize a cash settlement auction in which more than 570 counterparties participated. 
Although all participants in the credit derivatives market have a broad interest in seeing the market 
function well, their interests may diverge in a settlement situation when some are protection buyers, some 
are protection sellers, some would probably prefer physical settlement and some would prefer cash 
settlement. Getting market-wide agreement on an auction mechanism may not be easy, especially when the 
agreement is made after the default occurs. Moreover, the example of the European auctions of 
mobile-phone licenses reinforced the basic fact that differences in auction design can lead to vast 
differences in outcomes (Klemperer, 2002). 
The auction mechanism that was used for the Delphi auction in November 2005 has been tweaked since 
then to discourage gaming and to encourage broader participation. In the most recent large default in the 
CDS market, Dura Automotive Systems in late 2006, the most recent auction mechanism was tested and 
seemed to work well. However, each auction is an ad hoc process that must be quickly agreed to following 
a default. Settlement risk will still be high until the auction settlement mechanism is incorporated into 
standard CDS documentation and is tested in actual defaults, including some in less benign market 
environments. 
 
3.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has documented the striking growth of credit derivatives, from nearly nothing a decade ago to 
tens of billions of dollars in notional amounts outstanding at the end of last year. Driving this growth, 
commercial banks appear to find a variety of credit derivative products to be useful for their own risk 
management purposes. This paper discussed a number of the ways that credit derivatives can be useful for 
risk management. At the same time, credit derivatives are posing some significant risk management 
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challenges. Many of these challenges reflect the immaturity of the credit derivatives market. For the credit 
derivatives market to develop and mature, market participants must address these risk management 
challenges. 
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